Models of competition provide strong support for concerns about unilateral anticompetitive effects from mergers.
The Wide Array of Models
• Different models posit differing competitive environments and differing competitive decisions that firms make.
• Unilateral effects can occur with respect to prices, bids, promotions, quantities, capacities, and other decisions.
Merger Simulation
• Merger simulation takes an appropriate model, calibrates it with data, then computes the postmerger outcome.
• Merger simulation can be performed with many different models reflecting different competitive environments.
• Merger simulation requires no more data and little more effort than the application of other tools.
Differentiated Products Price Effects
• Price effects from differentiated products mergers are largely determined by diversion ratios among products combined.
• The relevant market is immaterial.
• The diversion ratio from A to B is the proportion of A's sales lost from an increase in its price that goes to B.
• After combining A and B through merger, the incentive to raise A's price is related to the resulting gain on B, and so to the diversion ratio from A to B times the margin earned on B.
Competitive Environment Matters
• The standard tool kit has several unilateral effects models corresponding to different competitive environments.
• Diversion ratios and margins are not always the critical determinants of unilateral effects.
• The relevant market is needed with most models.
• Sometimes, no model in the standard tool kit is a good fit.
What Is the Right Model?
• In cases involving differentiated consumer products, I think the standard model of price competition normally fits well.
• But I also ask whether the model explains premerger prices.
• Until further notice, I assume that this is the right model.
Simple Merger Simulation
• Gaps in data and estimation can be filled by assumptions.
• A simple merger simulation always can be calibrated from diversion ratios and margins for just the merging products.
• What the OFT terms "illustrative price rises" (IPRs) are predictions from the simplest possible merger simulations.
Dependence on Demand Curvature
• The price effects resulting from a merger depend on the curvature of demand for the products combined.
• The two IPR calculation done by the OFT were premised on different curvature assumptions, which mattered a lot.
• Any tool that avoids making an assumption relating to demand curvature cannot actually predict price effects.
Compensating Marginal Cost Reductions
• No demand curvature assumption is made in computing compensating marginal cost reductions (CMCRs).
• CMCRs are the reductions in marginal costs that exactly offset the unilateral price effects of a merger.
• CMCRs can be used in a quantitative analysis or just to identify the key determinants of unilateral effects.
Approximate CMCRs (aCMCRs)
• CMCRs depend on margins and diversion ratios.
• aCMCRs omit all second-order terms in the CMCRs and ignore the impact of differences in product prices.
• For a merger combining A and B, the aCMCR for product A is just B's margin times the diversion ratio from A to B.
• If A and B have similar prices and the diversion ratios are relatively low, this is a very close approximation.
Pricing Pressure Indexes
• Although not the original motivation, pricing pressure indexes are best seen as a variation on the idea of aCMCRs.
• GUPPI is usually defined as aCMCR times the product price.
• Only this relationship between aCMCR and GUPPI gives concrete meaning to GUPPI calculations.
Which Analytic Tools to Use
• Simplicity has advantages, and among the simplest tools, the aCMCRs have the most straightforward interpretation.
• Simple merger simulation requires more assumptions but not more data, and it yields price increase predictions.
• More complex merger simulation requires more data and effort, but is apt to be more accurate.
Diversion Ratios and Margins
• Diversion ratios can be estimated, approximated, or gleaned in many ways, and all present difficulties.
• Switching is not always due to price changes, and when it is not, it may be uninformative of diversion ratios.
• Marginal cost, and hence the price-cost margin, should be defined differently in different contexts.
• The magnitude of likely output changes is critical in deciding which costs are properly treated as marginal.
Unilateral Effects in Bidding
• Oral, or English, procurement auctions involve a form of price competition but the unilateral effects are different.
• Nothing like diversion ratios determine unilateral effects on winning bids; indeed, there is no postmerger diversion.
• The frequency and magnitude of unilateral effects depend partly on characteristics of nonmerging firms.
• Simulation can be used to predict the price effects of mergers in many auctions formats.
Unilateral Effects in Capacity
• Shutting down capacity could be profitable when merely reducing production is not.
• Dismantling capacity could be profitable when merely shutting it down is not.
• Analysis of just marginal incentive effects is not informative.
• Simple merger simulation can determine whether a merger makes it profitable to shut down or dismantle capacity.
Absence of Marginal Customers
• The propensity of marginal customers to switch normally is critical in an economic analysis of competition.
• The nature of the competitive process normally assures that marginal customers exist.
• But in some circumstances, no customers are on the margin, and the usual insights do not apply.
• In such circumstances, merger effects can be predicted with a one-off model.
Conclusions

Do the best you can with what you have where you are.
Make the best use of the available information at each stage of a merger assessment.
One size does not fit all.
Determine what tool to apply by understanding how competition works and which model fits.
